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What makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding 
commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context 
bargaining game known to exhibit competing claims to focality. In three treatments, our 
experiment varies one bargainer’s ability to commit, holding the soft leverage condition 
fixed. As in previous studies, we observe that opening offers are consistent with the 
available soft leverage. The influence of hard leverage is most evident in the concessionary 
stage. Hard and soft leverage interact to influence outcomes: Hard leverage advantages its 
holder, yet settlements largely stay between the two focal points. We posit that focal points 
induce mutual expectations of bargainer social preferences that, when combined with 
the Nash bargaining solution, imply the comparative statics concerning the settlements 
observed. A similarly modified version of the Zeuthen–Harsanyi model of the bargaining 
process, agrees with the comparative statics on opening offers and concessions.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
[E]ach party will make a concession at a given stage of the negotiation if and only if he thinks he has at least as much ”reason” as 
his opponent has to yield ground at that point.
[John C. Harsanyi (1956)]
[I]t often looks like the ultimate focus of agreement did not just reflect the balance of bargainer power but provided bargaining 
advantage to one side or the other. . . . One has to have a reason for standing firmly on a position.
[Thomas C. Schelling (1960)]
1. Introduction
What makes a bargaining proposal credible? Where will a bargainer make a stand and where will he back down? 
Both Harsanyi and Schelling argued that the answer has to do with reasons. Harsanyi argued that the reasons could be 
deduced from the mathematical game form and bargainer rationality. From this view, we derive hard leverage strategies 
for establishing credibility, strategies such as binding commitments. Schelling argued that focal points – context specific 
variables extraneous to the mathematical definition of the game form – can provide bargaining advantage as well. Focal 
points shaped by “analogy, precedent . . . and who the parties are and what they know about each other” among other 
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G.E. Bolton, E. Karagözoğlu / Games and Economic Behavior 99 (2016) 164–179 165variables (Schelling, p. 57).1 Focal points give rise to soft leverage strategies for establishing credibility, soft in the sense that 
they rely on mutual perceptions to coordinate bargainer expectations.2
In the economics literature, hard and soft leverage live largely separate lives. Soft leverage strategies have been inves-
tigated mostly in bargaining games with symmetric strategy spaces (ex., Roth, 1995).3 Hard leverage strategies play the 
central role in asymmetric bargaining games, particularly those where commitment power is distributed unequally (ex., 
Tadelis, 2013, chapter 11). One reason to wonder whether this division of labor characterizes the entire relationship hard 
and soft leverage share is that many if not most asymmetric bargaining encounters take place in a rich context. A ‘rich 
context’ is one that admits appeal to analogy, precedent, etc. In a rich context, even if one side in the negotiation has a hard 
leverage advantage, bargainers can find grist to fashion soft leverage strategies as well.
In fact, a rich context typically admits competing claims to focality. To give an example that will be relevant here, one 
bargainer might argue for a 50–50 split while another might argue for an asymmetric split based on precedent. Studies 
suggest that competing focal points can act to coordinate expectations. In assessing a series of bargaining experiments 
conducted with colleagues, Roth (1985) conjectured that, “[The] bargainers sought to identify initial bargaining positions 
that had some special reason for being credible, and that these credible bargaining positions then served as focal points that 
influenced the subsequent conduct of negotiations.” Some of the games ended in a settlement at one or the other focal point, 
while other settlements appeared as compromises between focal points. Gächter and Riedl (2005) studying a rich context 
bargaining game using a novel experimental design, found that most observed settlements appear as compromises between 
focal claims. Gächter and Riedl (2006) found that varying the asymmetric focal point leads to a shift in the distribution of 
settlements.
The major goal of our experiment is to generate data that informs us of what a theory that accounts for both soft and 
hard leverage need explain. We fashion our guiding hypotheses from the robust patterns of behavior previously observed 
in symmetric and asymmetric bargaining game experiments. The baseline treatment is a symmetric bargaining game. Bar-
gainers are given a fixed amount of time to communicate and reach a mutual agreement in a free form setting. We then 
create an asymmetric bargaining game by giving the high performer the option, which he can exercise at his discretion 
during the bargaining, to make a final offer that cannot be revoked (hence the high performer has full commitment power). 
A third treatment then draws the bargaining game closer to one that is fully asymmetric: The high performer is restricted 
to a final offer that the low performer must either accept or reject, with no further communication, eliminating the ability 
of the lower performer to ask for concessions. We examine how treatment manipulations affect both settlements and the 
process of the negotiations. To more fully gauge the coordinating influence of the focal points and commitment option, we 
ask bargainers prior to bargaining, what they think a neutral arbitrator would judge to be a fair settlement.
From the data, the observed influence of hard leverage on soft leverage runs as follows: The critical influence of soft 
leverage is on fairness judgments and on the opening offers made by bargainers. The influence of hard leverage is found 
in concession behavior. A bargainer facing a bargainer with the final offer option is the one more likely to bend in the 
concession process. Hard leverage holders do best in the final offer treatment (with modal offers and rejection rates below 
those in a typical ultimatum game).
None of our original hypotheses provides a totally satisfactory explanation for what we observe. Instead, we propose 
a simple model in which focal points induce mutual expectations of the social preferences of the bargainers. These social 
preferences are a generalization of those used to explain bargaining outcomes in low context bargaining games. Modifying 
the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) to reflect these preferences implies the comparative statics we observe regarding 
settlements. Modifying the Zeuthen–Harsanyi bargaining model (closely associated with the Nash solution in the literature) 
in a similar manner implies the comparative statics we observe with regard to opening offers and concessions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study both hard and soft leverage in rich context bargaining. 
Our work complements other recent studies of the influences on bargaining settlements. Birkeland (2013), in a bargaining 
game with production and arbitration, shows that settlements can be approximated by the modal focal outcomes bargain-
ers attribute to the arbitrator pool. Anbarcı and Feltovich (2013, 2014) study behavior in bargaining games that differ by 
disagreement outcomes; and find that settlements are substantially less sensitive to the level of disagreement payoffs than 
standard theory suggests. Our results share a similar flavor in that we find that hard leverage is less effective than one 
would expect. Rode and Le Menestrel (2011), using dictator and repeated Nash demand games, find that distribution of 
power influences both fairness judgments and distributive decisions.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and hypotheses. Section 3
reports the results. Section 4 presents the modified Zeuthen–Harsanyi model and discusses how it fits with our results. 
Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
1 In the negotiation literature (ex., Fisher et al., 2011), common focal points include market value, ethical standards, scientific judgment, professional 
codes, efficiency, cost, legal precedent, tradition, reciprocity and fair procedures.
2 See Innocenti (2008) for a historical account of Harsanyi’s and Schelling’s contrasting views on bargaining.
3 Focal points are also central to the study of tacit bargaining; ex., Isoni et al. (2013) and Embrey et al. (2014). Here we focus on direct (or explicit) 
bargaining; ex., Isoni et al. (2014).
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The experiment is designed to gauge the influence of hard leverage on soft leverage through the phases of the negotiation 
process.
2.1. Experimental design
Following Gächter and Riedl (2005), we create a bargaining environment with two competing claims to focality: the 
75–25 split based on precedent; and the 50–50 split.4,5 At the beginning of the experiment, each subject is informed that 
she is one of two department heads working for a (hypothetical) company. In the past, a salary budget of 4480 points 
was divided between department heads. High and low performing department heads received, respectively, 3360 and 1120 
points: a 75–25 split. Now, due to the economic downturn, the salary budget will be smaller, taking one of three values 
depending on the joint performance of the two department heads in a real effort task.6 Another difference from previous 
years is that top management will not dictate a salary distribution. Instead, the two department heads will negotiate the 
distribution. The negotiation procedure is varied over three treatments:
• Treatment 1 (T 1) Soft Leverage
◦ Unstructured bargaining.
◦ Maximum 10 minutes.
◦ In case of a disagreement, both subjects receive zero points.
◦ Communication through written verbal messages is allowed.
• Treatment 2 (T 2) Combined Leverage
◦ Treatment 1 plus:
◦ The high-performing department head is granted the option to make an ultimatum proposal at any point in time 
within 10 minutes.7
◦ Once and if the high-performing department head exercises the ultimatum proposal option, there is no turning back 
to the unstructured bargaining.
◦ In case the low-performing department head rejects the ultimatum proposal, both subjects receive zero points.
◦ Communication through written verbal messages is allowed in the unstructured bargaining phase but not in the 
ultimatum phase.
• Treatment 3 (T 3) Hard Leverage
◦ Ultimatum bargaining.
◦ The high-performing department head is granted the “proposer” role.
◦ In case the low-performing department head accepts the other’s proposal, they each receive their corresponding 
shares.
◦ In case of a rejection, both subjects receive zero points.
◦ Communication is not allowed.8
Table 1 summarizes the main elements of the experiment in the sequence they were presented to the subjects. Below, 
we explain each part in detail.
Performance and outcome determination. After reading instructions aloud, department heads’ performances are determined by 
a general knowledge quiz (Hoffman et al., 1994; Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Karagözoğlu and Riedl, 2015). The quiz consists 
of 36 multiple choice questions taken from fields of knowledge such as politics, music, arts, religion, astronomy, geography. 
Each question has five possible answers, and exactly one is correct (unanswered questions are scored incorrect). Each par-
4 See Güth and Tietz (1986), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Hoffman et al. (1994), Gantner et al. (2001), Cherry et al. (2002), and Gächter and Riedl (2005)
for related methods of creating asymmetric focal points in bargaining and distribution games.
5 The focal points in our study are payoff relevant. See the conclusion section for discussion of the applicability of our findings when focal points are 
payoff irrelevant.
6 We chose salary budgets that are lower than what was available in the past to create a conflicting claims environment. Historical claims (i.e., 3360 and 
1120) are not feasible under any of the possible budget levels.
7 To be as neutral as possible, this option is labeled as “final proposal option”, not as “ultimatum proposal option” in the experimental instructions. 
Moreover, we use the ultimatum game to vary the hard leverage across treatments since using the dictator game would practically turn the whole game 
in T2 to a dictator game and using the alternating offers bargaining game would unnecessarily add more complexity without bringing much advantage 
(e.g., alternating offers bargaining games exhibit results consistent with ultimatum game with regard to social preferences (see Bolton, 1991; Roth, 1995; 
De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008)).
8 We stick to the standard ultimatum game setup in T3 to have a completely asymmetric, hard-leverage bargaining game, and so no communication. This 
comes with a cost: moving from T2 to T3 two things change, elimination of communication and shift in bargaining protocol.
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Sequence of events.
1. Reading of instructions
2. Performance determination
3. Outcome determination
4. Elicitation of beliefs on performances




ticipant receives the same set of questions in the same order and has 20 seconds to answer each question. All of this is 
common knowledge.9
The size of the salary budget is determined by the joint performance of department heads in a pair and explained to the 
subjects in the following way:
• If the total number of correct answers in a pair is from 0 to 24, then the salary budget will be 1510 points.
• If the total number of correct answers in a pair is from 25 to 48, then the salary budget will be 2420 points.
• If the total number of correct answers in a pair is from 49 to 72, then the salary budget will be 3510 points.
In the experiment, 100 points are worth US$0.75. The medium salary budget of 2420 points then corresponds to roughly 
$32.
Elicitation of beliefs on performances. We ask each subject to report her beliefs about her own number of correct answers 
as well as her beliefs about the number of correct answers of the other department head. These belief elicitations are 
incentivized: for each estimation with 0/1/2 error(s), a subject earns 100/50/25 points; estimates with larger errors earn no 
points.
Relative performance information. Once the real effort task is complete, each subject is told who in her pair was the ‘high 
performer’ or ‘low performer’, depending on the number of correct answers given on the general knowledge quiz. In case of 
a tie, high and low performer titles are determined at random. To keep things simple, we did not provide exact task scores 
to the subjects. Earlier studies show that the information provided is enough to significantly influence subjects’ bargaining 
behavior (ex., Gächter and Riedl, 2005, 2006; Karagözoğlu and Riedl, 2015; Karagözoğlu and Kocher, 2015).
Fairness judgments. We asked bargainers to report what they thought an impartial arbitrator would judge to be a ‘fair’ 
distribution of salary budget using a question, adapted from Babcock et al. (1995): “According to your opinion, what would be a 
‘fair’ distribution of the salary budget from the vantage point of a non-involved neutral arbitrator?” What we seek to gauge is how 
fairness judgments change with the negotiating environment and to what extent the actions and settlements taken reflect 
these perceptions. Subjects’ fairness judgments are reported privately to avoid any strategic value the reporting might have. 
Gächter and Riedl (2005) compare asking for fairness judgments before and after role specific information (e.g., high vs. low 
performer information) and find no difference. Franco-Watkins et al. (2013) also find that asking about fairness judgments 
did not influence bargaining behavior. There is overwhelming evidence that bargaining subjects think about what is fair 
even absent asking (ex., Güth et al., 1982; Kahneman et al., 1986; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, essays in Bolton and Croson, 
2012).
Bargaining. In T1 and T2, bargaining is (almost) unstructured. Unstructured bargaining avoids exogenous first-mover ef-
fects and gives subjects as much bargaining freedom as possible (e.g., in the timing, sequence, number of proposals, and 
communication etc.). Subjects exchange proposals that consist of an amount for themselves and an amount for the other 
department head. A subject can send one verbal message per proposal (eliminates confusion about which proposal is being 
discussed).10 If subjects reach an agreement within the allotted 10 minutes, payoffs are awarded accordingly. If they do not, 
each earns zero points. In T2 the high performer has the option, exercisable at any time in the 10 minutes, to convert the 
bargaining to an ultimatum game (conversion is irrevocable). Once exercised, the high performer makes a final proposal 
that the low performer must either accept or reject. If he accepts, both get their corresponding shares; if he rejects both 
get zero. In T3, subjects play the ultimatum game (high performer is the proposer). To isolate the influence of concession 
behavior, no verbal communication is allowed in T2 or T3 ultimatum games.
9 See Karagözoğlu (2012) for a survey of bargaining and distribution games with joint production. See Birkeland (2013), Gantner and Kerschbamer (2016), 
Gantner et al. (2013), Luhan et al. (2013), Anbarcı and Feltovich (2014), and Fischbacher et al. (2014) for some recent examples.
10 See Appendix A for a detailed analysis of chat messages.
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bargaining outcome, (ii) opinion about the legitimacy of the quiz as a measure of general knowledge, (iii) perceived fairness 
of the bargaining procedure, and (iv) explanations for their bargaining behavior. They are also presented the Machiavelli 
personality test (MACH IV scale of Christie, 1970) to measure personality dimensions such as toughness, self-orientation, 
competitiveness, etc. that could be important in bargaining, and a risk attitude questionnaire (Dohmen et al., 2011). Fi-
nally, subjects answer questions about their personal background. We report on all of these individual characteristics in 
Appendix A.
The experiment was computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We conducted the experiment in 
LEMA (Laboratory for Economics, Management, and Auctions) at The Pennsylvania State University. In total 172 subjects 
participated in seven randomized experimental sessions. We had 29 pairs for T1, 29 pairs for T2 and 28 pairs for T3. 
Most of our subjects were undergraduates in economics, management, accounting, marketing, supply chain management, 
and finance. A typical session lasted 60–75 minutes (depending on the treatment). The average earnings per subject were 
approximately $22.70 (including a show-up fee of $5).
2.2. Hypotheses
Let AgreeHigh(T j) be the average agreed share the high performing bargainer receives in Treatment j. We study three 
simple benchmark hypotheses on how hard and soft leverage may influence settlements. Each is motivated by the existing 
literature on either soft or hard leverage.
Soft leverage hypothesis (null). Bargaining advantage is determined by the soft leverage in the bargaining environment. In a de-
sign similar to T1, Gächter and Riedl (2006) demonstrate that the induced focal point has clear effects on settlements in 
symmetric bargaining. Under the null hypothesis this pattern extends to all three treatments:
0.50 < AgreeHigh(T1) = AgreeHigh(T2) = AgreeHigh(T3) < 0.75.
What we know of hard leverage from studies of asymmetric bargaining games does not speak directly to what will happen 
in symmetric games. For this reason, the hard leverage hypotheses we consider are confined to predictions for T2 and T3. 
The hypotheses don’t make any distinction between T2 and T3 since hard leverage is equally available to the high performer 
in both.
Hard leverage hypothesis 1. The hard leverage advantage is equivalent to that of the first mover in the standard ultimatum game. In 
the standard ultimatum game, the average settlement has first movers receiving an average somewhat more than 50%, up 
to 60% of the pie (Roth, 1995).
0.50 ≤ AgreeHigh(T2) = AgreeHigh(T3) ≤ 0.60.
The 0.60 cutoff is an approximation but we think a defensible one; for example, in a widely cited study, Roth et al. 
(1991), for proposers in a $10 ultimatum game, the modal (and most generous) offer was typically 50–50 with an average 
offer of 61–39 split in their favor with a 27% rejection rate (lower offers to responder being more likely rejected). So 
settlements were in the range of the hypothesis (also see Slonim and Roth, 1998).11
Hard leverage hypothesis 2. Hard leverage enables the high performer to obtain 75% or more of the pie. The high performer in 
our experiment earned his role. List and Cherry (2000), studying an ultimatum game where the pie is fully produced by 
the proposer, report a higher number of asymmetric offers than is typical in a standard ultimatum game. The average 
demand was roughly 68%, with 27% of all offers demanding more than 75%. Rejection rates, however, were substantial, 
with demands of more than 50% rejected at an average rate of 31% to 44% depending on the treatment (rejection rates 
increased as offers decreased).12 These figures suggest average settlements substantially less asymmetric than 75–25; in 
fact, the modal settlement in the experiment was 50–50. The hard leverage hypothesis 2 conjecture is that the context of 
the present experiment – inducing a focal point at 75–25 – lends 75–25 a legitimacy not found in the earlier ultimatum 
game experiments.
AgreeHigh(T2) = AgreeHigh(T3) ≥ 0.75.
We use these hypotheses as guideposts for our investigation.
11 Statistics cited are averaged over 4 treatments. There were some statistically significant differences in play across the treatments but the differences 
were rather small in economic terms; see De Bruyn and Bolton (2008). Roth et al. also conducted $30 ultimatum game and found similar results to the $10 
games.
12 See Garcia-Gallego et al. (2008) for similar results in an experiment where responders in the ultimatum game work on a real effort task.
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3. Results
In this section we review results on settlements, fairness judgments, opening offers, and concession behavior. The inves-
tigation will lead us to a set of observed regularities which we check against the hypotheses we began with. Throughout, 
we express settlements in terms of shares to the high-performers and use nonparametric tests.13 In the tables, we report 
averages and standard deviations (in parentheses).
The overall average number of correct quiz answers was 20.9 out of a possible 36. High-performers (low-performers) 
averaged 23.8 (18.0) correct. In estimating their own (bargaining partner’s) number of correct answers, subjects’ average 
estimation mistake was 1.77 (1.12). Moreover, subjects’ beliefs were in line with their actual relative performances: the av-
erage high-performer predicted that he had more correct answers than his partner and the average low-performer predicted 
that he had less correct answers than his partner. Answers to debriefing questions show that subjects perceived the quiz as 
a legitimate measure of general knowledge.14 Answers also show that granting the right to exercise an ultimatum option to 
the high performing department head in T2 was judged legitimate.15 The three budget levels 1560, 2420, and 3510 occurred 
2, 70, and 14 times, respectively. There are no significant differences in variables of interest across different budget levels. 
Hence, we pool all salary budgets together in our analyses.
3.1. Settlements and comparison with the three hypotheses
To start with, disagreement rates in our experiment were low. One bargaining game ended in disagreement in T1 (3.4%), 
none in T2 (0%), and two in T3 (7.0%). We return to the disagreement rates below.
13 We check for treatment effects on averages and distributions using Mann–Whitney and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests respectively. We report only the 
Mann–Whitney test results when both tests give significant results.
14 On a 7-point Likert scale where “7 = agree very much”, average (median) degree of agreement with the statement “In my view the knowledge questions 
have been difficult” is 4.5 (5). Average (median) degree of agreement with the statement “The one with the better general knowledge is able to answer 
more questions correctly” is 5.58 (6).
15 25 out of 29 high-performers and 19 out of 29 low-performers in T2 found it perfectly fair and legitimate.
170 G.E. Bolton, E. Karagözoğlu / Games and Economic Behavior 99 (2016) 164–179Table 2




a The average agreed share of high performers in the three pairs where 
the final offer option is exercised is 0.69. In the remaining pairs, it is 0.58. 
Finally, high performers’ expected payoffs across T2 and T3 (i.e., factoring in 
rejections/disagreements) are identical.
With regard to settlements: Figs. 1(a), (b), and (c) show the distribution of high-performers’ agreed shares for each 
treatment. The distributions differ substantially and systematically: With one exception, T1 settlements range from 50–50 
to about 60–40, with peaks that roughly correspond to the two ends of the range. For T2, there is still a peak at 50–50 but 
now the range has widened to include 75–25 with less clustering at 60–40. Only three high-performers exercised the final 
offer option in T2 (corresponding proposals were 0.63, 0.70, and 0.74). T3 shows a further shift to the right; now there is a 
new peak at 70–30, the 60–40 peak remains but the 50–50 peak is gone.
Average settlements, reported in Table 2, show the rise in average agreed share across treatments, conditional on 
agreement (results are qualitatively the same if we include disagreements).16 The Kruskal–Wallis test strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that agreed shares are identical across treatments (p = 0.0004). Pairwise test results are also along the same 
lines: AgreeHigh(T1) is significantly less than AgreeHigh(T2) (one-sided, p = 0.0438) and AgreeHigh(T2) is significantly less than 
AgreeHigh(T3) (one-sided, p = 0.0136).
The shift in average settlements across treatments clearly rejects the soft leverage hypothesis. That said, the hy-
pothesis does get the range of settlements correct. In particular, no single focal point makes a satisfactory account of 
the data: AgreeHigh(T1) = 0.55 is significantly different from 0.5 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided, p = 0.0002) and 
AgreeHigh(T3) = 0.64 is significantly different from 0.75 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided, p < 0.0001). Below, we will 
see that certain features of the negotiation process are also fixed across treatments as the soft leverage hypothesis would 
lead us to expect.
Hard leverage hypothesis 1 (based on standard ultimatum game behavior) anticipates the clustering in settlements ob-
served near 50–50 in T2 and (may be less so) in T3. But average settlements are higher than anticipated with a significant 
number of settlements above 60–40 so that the distributions of settlements is not skewed towards 50–50 as is common in 
standard ultimatum games (Güth and Kocher, 2014). It is clear, particularly from the T3 distribution, that 75–25 settlements 
have a viability the hypothesis does not anticipate.
The hard leverage 2 hypothesis does anticipate the acceptability of a 75–25 offer. But actual average offers (and settle-
ments) are lower than 75%. Moreover, the 50–50 focal point still appears relevant to explaining settlements, particularly 
for T2. Other patterns differ substantially from the ultimatum game evidence that the hypothesis is based on (see sec-
tion 2.2). The rejection rates of 0% and 7% observed in T2 and T3, respectively, are far lower than the 31% to 44% rates 
reported by List and Cherry (2000) ultimatum game experiment with joint production and earned roles. Also, there is only 
one demand in T3 (3.5%) above 75% versus 27% in List and Cherry (their experiment did not induce an asymmetric focal 
point).
Observe that neither of the hard leverage hypotheses predicts the difference in average agreements across T2 and T3. 
One hypothesis is that the difference has to do with the potential to induce concession behavior (communication). This can 
explain why hard leverage is more effective in the final offer treatment than in the interaction treatment. But it cannot 
explain the influence of hard leverage when moving from T1 and T2, since communication is held constant. Likewise, the 
fact that the final offer mechanism is optional can explain the differences between T2 and T3 but does not explain much 
about the other settlement regularities we observe.
To summarize, none of the hypotheses provide a clean explanation for the shifts we observe in settlements across 
treatments. To better understand the pattern of settlements, we next investigate behavior during the process of negotiation.
3.2. Fairness judgments
After producing the bargaining pie but prior to negotiating we asked bargainers to report what they thought an impartial 
arbitrator would judge to be a ‘fair’ distribution of the salary budget. The resulting data sheds light on how and to what 
extent the competing focal points shape bargainers’ expectations of a bargaining settlement. Table 3 shows average fairness 
judgments of high and low-performers in all three treatments.
One of the robust findings on fairness judgments in bargaining is that they exhibit a self-serving (egocentric) bias 
(Messick and Sentis, 1979; Bazerman, 1985; Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Gächter and Riedl, 2005, 
and Karagözoğlu and Riedl, 2015). Our data exhibits self-serving biases as well. Writing the average fairness judgment of 
16 Median agreed shares for high-performers are similar: 0.55 in T1, 0.58 in T2, and 0.62 in T3.
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Average fairness judgments of high and low performers.
T1 T2 T3
High-performers 0.65 0.66 0.67
(0.13) (0.09) (0.10)
Low-performers 0.56 0.59 0.57
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Fig. 2. (a) Fairness judgments in T1. (b) Fairness judgments in T2. (c) Fairness judgments in T3.
bargainer i in Treatment j as Fairi(T j), Fairhigh(T j) > Fairlow(T j) (two-sided, p < 0.0025 for all j = 1, 2, 3 Mann–Whitney 
test).
From Fig. 2, observe that the focal points largely bound the self-serving bias in settlement expectations. Only 5 out of 
86 low performers’ fairness judgments are lower than 50% and only 2 are above 75%. Only 11 out of 86 high performers’ 
fairness judgments are higher than 75% and none are below 50%. Also observe that the majority of both low and high per-
formers report judgments that imply high performers should get more than low performers17; in fact, Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests show that Fairhigh(T j) > 1/2 and Fairlow(T j) > 1/2 for all, j = 1, 2, 3 (two-sided, for high-performers all p < 0.0001; 
and for low-performers all p < 0.0003).18
How does hard leverage influence fairness judgments? Lerner and Miller (1978) argue that people have a tendency to 
believe that the world they are living in is a just one (known as the belief in a just world hypothesis). An implication for 
our experiment is that the more hard leverage a bargainer has the higher share of the surplus he justly deserves. The data 
we have, however, does not favor this hypothesis. As Table 3 reports, both high and low performers’ fairness judgments are 
constant across treatments. Kruskal–Wallis tests fail to reject both Fairhigh(T1) = Fairhigh(T2) = Fairhigh(T3) (p = 0.8002) and 
Fairlow(T1) = Fairlow(T2) = Fairlow(T3) (p = 0.1103). Binary comparisons yield an identical result: Fairhigh(T1) and Fairhigh(T2)
17 Observe that agreements in all treatments are between high and low performers’ fairness judgments. In T1 and T2, agreements are closer to low-
performers’ fairness judgments (0.55 ≤ 0.55 < 0.66 and 0.59 < 0.60 < 0.66, respectively), whereas in T3 they are closer to high-performers’ fairness 
judgments (0.57 < 0.64 < 0.67).
18 Gächter and Riedl (2005, 2006) and Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2015) report similar findings.
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Average opening offers of high and low performersa.
T1 T2
High-performers’ opening offer 0.72 0.73
(0.13) (0.13)
Low-performers’ opening offer 0.46 0.46
(0.15) (0.11)
a In T3, there is no unstructured bargaining and the proposer is fixed. Hence, we do not 
include the proposals made in T3 here. Note that the average ultimatum offer in T3 is 0.65.
Fig. 3. Distributions of high and low performers’ opening offers.
are not different (two-sided, p = 0.6912). Fairhigh(T2) and Fairhigh(T3) are not different either (two-sided, p = 0.7368). 
Fairlow(T1) and Fairlow(T2) are statistically not different according to Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (corrected p = 0.279) but 
different according to Mann–Whitney test (two-sided, p = 0.0435). Finally, Fairlow(T2) and Fairlow(T3) are statistically not 
different (two-sided, p = 0.2431).
To sum up, the presence of hard leverage has little effect on fairness judgments. The competing focal points coordinate 
settlement expectations in the sense that bargainers largely agree that a settlement deemed fair by a neutral arbitrator 
would be one that falls within the compromise interval between the two focal points. Within this interval, however, we 
observe self-serving biases across high and low performers.
3.3. Opening offers
The opening offer in a bargaining pair is the very first offer made. The main reason we focus on opening offers is that 
they are known to be highly predictive of the remainder of the bargaining process and eventual settlements (Chertkoff and 
Conley, 1967; Yukl, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996; Park et al., 2010; Galinsky et al., 2009; Karagözoğlu and Riedl, 2015).
In T1, high and low performers make the opening offer in roughly equal numbers (14 and 15, respectively). In T2, 
18 (11) of the subjects who make the opening offer were high (low) performers (two-sample test of proportions, two-sided, 
p = 0.066). Table 4 reports the averages of opening offers in pairs in T1 and T2, Fig. 3 shows the distributions.
Observe that average opening offers for the two bargaining roles are near identical across treatments. Denote the av-
erage opening offer of bargainer i in Treatment j by Firsti(T j). Firsthigh(T1) and Firsthigh(T2) are statistically not different 
(two-sided, p = 0.8195), nor are Firstlow(T1) and Firstlow(T2) statistically different (two-sided, p = 0.6941). The important 
implication is that the introduction of hard leverage has little influence on opening offer behavior.19
Fig. 4 shows that the largest fraction of high performers’ first offers center around 75–25 division, whereas the largest 
fraction of low performers’ first offers center around 50–50 division in T1 and T2.20
All in all, high performer opening offers were more aggressive in T1 and T2 than ultimatum proposals in T3. There is no 
evidence that the presence (T2) or absence (T1) of a hard leverage option influence subjects’ opening offers. Opening offers 
reflect the fairness bias identified in section 3.2, with the average high performer offering closer to a 75–25 split and the 
average low performer offering closer to 50–50.
19 There is no significant correlation between opening proposals and counter-proposals in either T1 or T2.
20 Note that transposed figures would represent cumulative distributions.
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Table 5
Settlements, opening offers, counter-offers and yielding (in high performer shares).
T1 T2 p-value
High_performer_agreed_share 0.55 0.60 0.043∗∗
High_performer_first_offer 0.68 0.69 0.616
Low_performer_first_offer 0.45 0.51 0.075∗
High_performer_opening_offer 0.72 0.73 0.820
Low_performer_opening _offer 0.46 0.46 0.659
High_performer_counter_offer 0.64 0.64 0.770
Low_performer_counter_offer 0.45 0.54 0.008∗∗∗
3.4. Concession behavior
So far, we have detected no difference in bargaining behavior across T1 and T2. Yet we saw that settlements across these 
treatments do in fact differ. It turns out that the difference has to do with concessions implicit in initial counter-offers. 
Table 5 displays high and low performers’ first offers conditional on agreements, in T1 and T2. First, a clarification: if a 
bargainer was the first to put a division on the table, her first offer qualifies as an opening offer. If a bargainer did not 
initiate the negotiation, her first offer is a counter-offer to the opening offer. From Table 5 we see that the more favorable 
agreements for high performers in T2 than in T1 are not due to differences in first offers, but rather reflect difference in low 
performer counter-offers (0.54 compared to 0.45).
Neither opening offers nor counter-offers of high performers differ across treatments, nor do low performers’ opening 
offers. But low performers’ counter-offers do differ: facing the same average opening offer as in T1, low performer coun-
teroffers in T2 concede almost 10% point more to high performers. A higher percentage of opening offers were made by 
high performer in T2 than T1 (section 3.3), compounding the effect of the low performer counter-offer difference on settle-
ments. Further investigation using regression analysis yields similar results to those reported in Table 5; see Tables A.3–A.6 
in Appendix A.
3.5. A summary of the observed regularities
1. Settlements fall with few exceptions between the two focal points, 50–50 and 75–25. The high performer captures a 
higher share, on average, when endowed with hard leverage in T2 and T3, although the size of the effect is significantly 
smaller in T2.
2. Judgments of what a neutral arbitrator would deem fair are in all cases between the two focal points and do not differ 
statistically across treatments (varying hard leverage does not influence fairness assessments). High and low performer 
assessments exhibit self-serving biases.
3. Opening offers in T1 and T2 are significantly more aggressive than fairness assessments: The average opening offer of high 
(low) performers approximates 75–25 (50–50). In T3 high performers’ opening offers approximate fairness judgments, 
and are significantly lower than high performer opening offers in the other treatments.
4. Concession behavior. Low performer counter-offers (made in response to an opening offer) concede more in T2 than 
in T1.
4. A modified Nash bargaining solution
How might we explain the regularities stated in section 3.5? In section 4.1 we sketch a model positing that competing 
focal points create mutual expectations of the range of acceptable settlements, the characterization of the underlying social 
preferences being an extension of those used to explain ultimatum game behavior. The Nash bargaining solution can explain 
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Harsanyi (1956, 1977) used to motivate the Nash bargaining solution. The modified model can explain why opening offers 
cluster around the focal points and why hard leverage has its main influence through concessions.
We hasten to note that ours is not the only potential candidate for explaining these regularities. Another approach, for 
example, is a model with endogenous reference points that shifts with the structure or context of the bargaining game. 
The theory we sketch borrows from the social preference models of behavior in ultimatum and associated alternating 
offer bargaining games (ex., De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008). Subgame perfect equilibrium from these models is consistent 
with observed ultimatum game settlements clustering near 50–50 with the first mover having a modest advantage. But 
this characterization does not fit our data: For example, the clustering around 50–50 in T1 and T2 disappears in T3, the 
treatment most like the ultimatum game (Fig. 1). Shifting the model reference point from 50–50 to 75–25 helps explain the 
low rejection rates in T2 to T3, but also makes it difficult to explain why there are settlements below the new reference 
point. The model we sketch takes explicit account of the competing focal points.
4.1. Social preference modification of the Nash bargaining solution
The key innovation we introduce to the Nash bargaining solution is to suppose that the focal points define the limits 
of potential compromise. We capture this through a social preference characterization. Consider a negotiation between a 
high (h) and low (l) performer. Bargainers are risk averse with utility uh(xh) and ul(xl) for a settlement of x = (xh,xl), 
xh + xl = 100. Let f i = ( f ii , f i∼i) be the focal point favored by bargainer i. We assume that f ii > f ∼ii ; that is, each bargainer 
favors the focal point that gives him the larger share of the bargaining pie. We consider two types of bargainer:
Compromising bargainer. Let Xi = {x|xi ≥ f ∼ii }. Then for all x, y ∈ Xi such that xi > yi, ui(xi) > ui(yi) > ui(0). For all x /∈
Xi, ui(xi) < ui(0).
That is, a compromising bargainer has standard self-interested preferences over the domain in which his share of a 
settlement is at least as high as the share he would receive from the focal point the other bargainer favors. For shares below 
this point, he prefers the (0, 0) outcome.
Non-compromising bargainer. Let Xin = {x|xi ≥ f ii }. Then for all x, y ∈ Xin such that all xi > yi, ui(xi) > ui(yi) > ui(0). For all 
x /∈ Xin, ui(xi) < ui(0).
Hence non-compromising bargainers prefer the (0, 0) outcome to accepting a share less than what they would receive 
by their favored focal point.
For purposes of illustration, we suppose the high performing bargainer is a compromising bargainer. The low performing 
bargainer is a compromising bargainer with probability 1 − ε and a non-compromiser with probability ε. We assume the 
high performer knows (only) the probability of his bargaining partner being a compromiser.21
Combining this preference specification with the Nash bargaining solution, we can explain the difference in average 





) = (1 − ε)uh(75) + εuh(0) for z′h > 50. (1)









where d = (dh, dl) defines the smallest settlement shares that each bargainer finds acceptable to agree on. Consider the 
bargaining game in T1: If the high performer is matched with a compromising low bargainer, the set of acceptable divisions 
xh − xl are between 50–50 and 75–25, implying d = (25, 50). Let x∗1 be the T1 bargaining game settlement predicted by (2). 
The value of x∗1 will be a compromise between the two extremes 50 < x∗1h < 75, the exact compromise depending on 
the comparative risk aversion of the bargainers (Roth, 1979). If the low bargainer is a non-compromiser, there is only one 
feasible settlement, 50–50. The expected settlement for T1 is therefore 50ε + (1 − ε)x∗1h .
For treatments T2 and T3, dl remains at 25 but dh increases with the introduction of the final offer option. To see this, 
observe that condition (1) implies the optimal high performer final offer is 75–25. So in the T2 unstructured bargaining 
phase, the high performer will agree to a settlement no smaller than z′h (as defined in (1)); that is, dh = z′h . If the low 
performer is a non-compromiser, the game ends with no settlement – both unstructured and final offer bargaining end in 
disagreement. But if the low performer is a compromiser, the increase in dh will result is a Nash bargaining settlement 
x∗2h > x
∗1




h < 75. So the expected settlement for T2 is greater than that for T1. For T3, there 
21 Our conclusions would not change if we assume there are some non-compromisers among high performers.
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1 − ε. Since 75 > x∗2h , the expected settlement in T3 is greater than that in T2.
This simple model captures some features of the variation in settlements but fails in regard to others. For T1 and T2, 
the model predicts settlements should range from 50–50 to 75–25, a close approximation to what is observed (Fig. 1). 
But neither the range in settlements in T3 nor the clustering (sometimes) observed near focal points are accounted for. 
A more refined model, one that allows for more nuanced compromising tolerance than found in the two-type model, might 
explain at least some of the missing variation. The fairness assessments given by bargainers (Fig. 2) are suggestive of a wide 
variation in compromise tolerance. Some low performers, for example, might be willing to compromise up to 67–33 but 
not all the way to 75–25. Another factor that might explain the missing variation is differences in negotiating skill (see 
section 4.2).
Notes: The compromiser/non-compromiser formulation suggests a measurement of a focal point’s credibility, with higher 
recognition (lower ε) making for greater credibility. A model that characterizes the value of ε more fully might link low 
focal point credibility to disagreement and delay in bargaining, as well as explain some of the variation in outcomes.
Finally, in the symmetric version of the model all bargainers favor the same focal point, and so both bargainer types, 
compromising and non-compromising, require at least 50% to accept a settlement. The predicted settlement is then 50–50, 
consistent with the well-known regularity of free form symmetric bargaining that settlements cluster tightly about 50–50 
(Roth, 1995).
4.2. A simple model of the bargaining process
Harsanyi (1956, 1977) extended and generalized Zeuthen’s (1930) model of the bargaining concession process by way 
of providing a foundation for the Nash bargaining solution. We can use the same model, modified by the social preference 
characterization provided above, to explain why opening offers cluster at the focal points, and why the influence of hard 
leverage is through the concession process (regularities 3 and 4, section 3.5).22
Applied to the bargaining game in T1, the Zeuthen–Harsanyi model runs as follows: Bargaining is broken into periods. In 
each period, high (h) and low (l) performing bargainers simultaneously make a proposal for splitting the pie, respectively 
h = (hh, hl) and l = (lh, ll) where i j is the share i offers to j. If the proposals are compatible in that hh ≤ lh and ll ≤ hl , 
then the game ends with each bargainer getting the share he proposed for himself. Otherwise the game continues to the 
next period, where each bargainer (simultaneously) has the option to either make a concession (decrease her own payoff 
and increase the payoff of the other bargainer) or make no concession. The game ends in the first period proposals are 
compatible, or in the first period in which neither bargainer makes a concession. In the latter case, payoffs are given by the 
disagreement outcome. To ensure the game is finite, we assume any concession to be at least a fixed minimum amount as 
specified by Harsanyi (1977, p. 152).
The Zeuthen–Harsanyi model focuses on the question of which bargainer will make a concession at a given period with 
given proposals on the table. The answer, known as the Zeuthen Principle, asserts that the bargainer least willing to take 
a risk that the bargaining will end in conflict is the one that concedes. Here we modify the principle to account for the 
influence of focal points on perceived credibility. We first calculate the risk limit for each bargainer. Suppose that h and l are 
the two (incompatible) proposals currently on the table. The high performer’s risk limit, stated as a probability, is rh . When 
50 ≤ lh ≤ 75, rh is defined by
uh(lh) = (1 − rh) · uh(hh) + rh · uh(50). (3)
That is, the risk limit is the breakeven probability such that the high performer is indifferent between accepting the present 
low performer offer and taking the risk of standing on his present offer on the assumption that the worst possible outcome 
is 50–50, the least favorable, mutually acceptable division. Mathematically, the calculation of the risk limit in (3) differs 
from Zeuthen–Harsanyi in just one respect, the substitution of 50 for the disagreement payoff.23 If the low performer is 
offering the high performer less than 50, rh = 1, the highest possible risk limit. Intuitively, the high performer does not find 
it credible that the low performer will stand on a demand for more than 50%. By similar reasoning, if the low performer 
offers more than 75, rh = 0, the lowest possible risk limit since this is more than the high performer could credibly demand 




1, if lh < 50
uh(hh)−uh(lh)
uh(hh)−uh(50) , if 50 ≤ lh ≤ 75.
0, if lh > 75
(4)
The risk limit for the low performer is measured in an analogous way.
22 See Birkeland and Tungodden (2014) for a recent paper that studies the effect of fairness motivations on the bargaining outcome in Nash bargaining.
23 The original Zeuthen–Harsanyi has been criticized for being too pessimistic, omitting the possibility of compromise from the calculation. The modified 
version proposed here is less pessimistic. See Harsanyi (1977) for a discussion of the potential justifications for the original calculation.
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1, if hl < 25
ul(ll)−ul(hl)
ul(ll)−ul(25) , if 25 ≤ hl ≤ 50.
0, if hl > 50
We then apply a version of the Zeuthen Principle, we call it the credibility principle because of the modifications we 
made: Bargainer i makes a concession if she has the lowest risk limit: ri ≤ r j . The intuition is similar to that behind the 
Zeuthen Principle: Deadlocked with incompatible demands, and with time passing, the probability of conflict rises until one 
bargainer reaches his risk limit and breaks the deadlock by making a concession.24 In the case of the credibility principle, 
the concession is based on mutual expectations of what is acceptable, with the final fallback position for the conceding 
bargainer being the least favorable focal point.
The credibility principle constitutes a form of risk dominance in that the bargainer running the highest risk concedes 
ground to the other bargainer (Harsanyi, 1977). In Zeuthen/Harsanyi’s treatment, risk limits are defined as given above save 
that the last term in the denominator is a disagreement payoff instead of the low-end focal point that the bargainer can 
achieve. As a result, all of the theorems proved for the Zeuthen–Harsanyi game apply here, treating the focal points as the 
disagreement payments.
Note that there is no reason for either bargainer to demand more than their preferred focal point since doing so will 
simply lead them to make unreciprocated concessions.
Proposition 1. If bargainers offer their preferred focal point in period 1 and then follow the credibility principle, the bargaining ends 
in the Nash bargaining solution with disagreement outcome d = (dhdl).
Proof (follows section 4, Harsanyi, 1956). Bargainer i makes a concession anytime ri ≤ r j making i the conceding bargainer. 
Let’s suppose i = h (the choice is arbitrary). Then substituting the formulas for ri and r j , and doing some algebra, we have:
π(H) = [uh(hh) − uh(dh)
][
ul(lh) − ul(dl)
] ≤ [ul(lh) − uh(dh)
] ∗ [ul(ll) − ul(dl)
] = π(L)
where π(X) is the Nash product of bargainer X ’s proposal. In words, the conceding bargainer is the one with the lowest 
Nash product. So long as the Nash product is below its optimum value, one or the other bargainer will need concede to 
increase it. A settlement is reached once proposals converge on the Nash product. 
What does the model explain about the experiment? We observed that the model predicts that the opening offers should 
approximate the offerers’ favored focal point (75–25 or 50–50) in both T1 and T2, consistent with regularity 3. In addition, 
from Proposition 1 it is clear that the extent of concessions made is related to the values (dh, dl). Specifically, an increase in 
dh of the sort implied in moving from T1 to T2 (see section 4.1) is predicted to lead the low performer to make relatively 
greater concessions than the high performer, consistent with observation (regularity 4, section 3.5). As before, the model 
does not account for the full variation in behavior that we observe. For example, some opening offers are between the two 
focal points (Fig. 3). One hypothesis is that this variation is due to a lack of skill on the part of some bargainers – they 
concede too much too soon. This might also explain some of the aforementioned variation in settlements missed by the 
modified Nash bargaining model (section 4.1).
Proposition 1 explores the dynamic properties of a game but is not an equilibrium analysis. Harsanyi (1977, p. 158) con-
siders a “compressed Zeuthen game” with just two periods. In period 1, bargainers make opening offers. In period 2, they 
each either accept the other bargainer’s proposal or stand firm on their own proposal. Harsanyi shows that the only equi-
librium settlement that is consistent with the Zeuthen Principle is the Nash bargaining solution. Substituting the modified 
Nash bargaining game considered in section 4.1, the same proof shows that the only subgame perfect equilibrium for the 
above game that is consistent with the credibility principle is one in which bargainers both propose and accept the Nash 
solution.
5. Conclusions
We investigated the relative credibility of hard leverage (commitment actions) and soft leverage (focal points) for bar-
gainer advantage in a rich context bargaining game where there are two competing focal points. The most important findings 
have to do with where hard and soft leverage enter the bargaining process. The influence of soft leverage is most evident 
on bargainers’ fairness judgments and opening offers. The influence of hard leverage is most evident in the concessionary 
stage. Hard and soft leverage interact to influence outcomes: Hard leverage advantages its holder, yet settlements largely 
stay between the two focal points.
The comparative statics we observe (section 3.5) fit, to a first approximation, with the Nash and associated Zeuthen–
Harsanyi bargaining models, modified to account for the role that competing focal points play in coordinating bargainer 
expectations. The model is a first effort in an area (rich context bargaining) where little is known. No doubt other models 
24 Thus the prediction of who will back down does not assume complete information about risk preferences. See Roth (1979)’s discussion of the intuition 
behind the Zeuthen Principle.
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implies untested hypotheses to guide additional research, data from which might then lead to a refinement of the present 
model or a different model altogether. For example, the model implies that shifting the asymmetric focal point from 75–25 
(in either direction) should shift bargaining outcomes in all three treatments in the same direction, with the compara-
tive statics across treatments that we found still holding. Data from such an experiment could give us greater insight into 
bargainer willingness to compromise, something the simple model we present approximates only coarsely.
An important caveat to our results is that the focal points are payoff relevant. Focal points can be non-payoff relevant 
as well; see for example, Sugden (1995). Potentially, bargaining involving non-payoff relevant focal points might display a 
different pattern than we observe here. Note, however, that the characterization of the role of focal points presented here 
rests not with the payoff relevance of the focal point but rather on whether bargainers recognize one another claim to 
focality as credible. So we conjecture that our results will generalize to non-payoff relevant focal points so long as they 
meet the credibility criterion.
What else could change our result? One might hypothesize that having more than two focal points attenuates the in-
fluence of any one focal point. But what appears to be important about focal points is that they are starting places for the 
compromise process. So long as each bargainer can identify a most favored focal point – sufficiently credible to the other 
side – this should be sufficient to orient the negotiation. More likely to change things is a situation where one or both 
bargainers claim to focality is not considered sufficiently credible by the other side. For instance, if the exogenously imple-
mented reference point in the experiment was rather extreme (e.g., 99–1), it might not serve as a credible reference point. 
These circumstances, might for example, lead to more disagreement outcomes than the case examined here or agreements 
that are less predictable by the reference point outcome.25 The assumptions on the credibility parameter in our model could 
be adjusted to accommodate these circumstances.
What might make hard leverage more influential in the sense of trumping the focal structure of the negotiation? Perhaps 
higher stakes such that one side’s commitment threatens the other side with very substantial losses. But this is not obvious: 
Most experiments increasing the stakes in ultimatum games find at most, modest shifts in behavior; the exceptions involving 
very high stakes (see Karagözoğlu and Urhan, 2016 for a survey; the review in Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming; Andersen et 
al., 2011 for an exception).
Another potential caveat to our results is that the bargaining game is played only once. Whether our results would 
survive if subjects had more experience playing the game is an open question. Also, moving from T2 to T3, both the hard 
leverage and the availability of communication change. Research shows that communication may help bargainers in arguing 
for their favored focal points (see Karagözoğlu and Kocher, 2015 for a recent example). Hence, if we had an ultimatum 
game treatment with pre-play communication, depending on the persuasiveness and risk attitudes (since possibly some 
messages would employ threats) of bargainers we could have observed different outcomes. Nevertheless, we conjecture 
that the results from such a treatment would be qualitatively similar (to the ones from T3) since the limited pre-play 
communication would preserve the effects of increased hard leverage.
In closing, we point to one area of investigation in particular that might lead to large gains in understanding: While we 
were able to offer a preliminary explanation for the comparative static regularities of the experiment, observed behavior 
varied more widely than the explanations imply. At least some of this variation might be explained by a more nuanced 
understanding of bargainer willingness to make concessions towards the focal point that favors the other bargainer. Finding 
a reliable quantitative measure for the ‘credibility’ of a focal point might be the key here. The model we sketched in 
section 4.1 offers a simple measure that might be taken as a starting point but surely other candidates are possible; the 
ideal would be a model in which reference points emerge endogenously.
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